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HomeMy WebLinkAboutUpdate Documents - District CourtAGENDA Office: District Court and Superior Court Date of meeting: July 15th , 2025 Provided documents are italicized Tnpirq • G R 29 Review o GR29(f)(5)(b) • DC 2023 updates by BDB/DJO o DC CBA • Misunderstandings with HR o MOU meeting with HR o Grant County Personnel Policy o Mandatory Training o Timeclock policy • RecentJudicial Conference &Council on Independent Courts highlighted Judicial Independence o Bench card o Judicial Independence Slides o Adams County/Grant County Case o Judge Lev vs. City of Bellingham (2021) o Recent Cases • Moving forward with independence GR 29 PRESIDING JUDGE IN SUPERIOR COURT DISTRICT AND LIMITED JURISDICTION COURT DISTRICT (a) Election, Term, Vacancies, Removal and Selection Criteria --Multiple Judge Courts. (1) Election. Each superior court district and each limited jurisdiction court district (including municipalities operating municipal courts) having more than one judge shall establish a procedure, by local court rule, for election, by the judges of the district, of a Presiding Judge, who shall supervise the judicial business of the district. In the same manner, the judges shall elect an Assistant Presiding Judge of the district who shall serve as Acting Presiding Judge during the absence or upon the request of the Presiding Judge and who shall perform such further duties as the Presiding Judge, the Executive Committee, if any, or the majority of the judges shall direct. If the judges of a district fail or refuse to elect a Presiding Judge, the Supreme Court shall appoint the Presiding Judge and Assistant Presiding Judge. (2) Term. The Presiding Judge shall be elected for a term of not less than two years, subject to reelection. The term of the Presiding Judge shall commence on January 1 of the year in which the Presiding Judge's term begins. (3) Vacancies. Interim vacancies of the office of Presiding Judge or Acting Presiding Judge shall be filled as provided in the local court rule in (a)(1). (4) Removal. The Presiding Judge maybe removed by a majority vote of the judges of the district unless otherwise provided by local court rule. (5) Selection Criteria. Selection of a Presiding Judge should be based on the judge's 1) management and administrative ability, 2) interest in serving in the position, 3) experience and familiarity with a variety of trial court assignments, and 4) ability to motivate and educate other judicial officers and court personnel. A Presiding Judge must have at least four years of experience as a judge, unless this requirement is waived by a majority vote of the judges of the court. Commentary It is the view of the committee that the selection and duties of a presiding judge should be enumerated in a court rule rather than in a statute. It is also our view that one rule should apply to all levels of court and include single judge courts. Therefore, the rule should be a GR (General Rule). The proposed rule addresses the process of selection/removal of a presiding judge and an executive committee. It was the intent of the committee to provide some flexibility to local courts wherein they could establish, by local rule, a removal process. Additionally, by delineating the selection criteria for the presiding judge, the committee intends that a rotational system of selecting a presiding judge is not advisable. (b) Selection, Term, and Designation of Presiding Judge Pro Tempore-Single Judge Courts. In court districts or municipalities having only one judge, that judge shall serve as the Presiding Judge for the judge's term of office, and shall predesignate and prepare a Presiding Judge Pro Tempore to fulfill presiding judge duties in the case of illness, incapacity, resignation, death, or unavailability of the judge. Commentary In training and preparing the designated Presiding Judge Pro Tempore to fulfill presiding judge duties, a Presiding Judge from a single judge court should address the significant and nondelegable administrative, budgetary, and personal responsibilities of a presiding judge under this court rule, any obligations under collective bargaining agreement(s) or law(s) applicable to court personnel, inter urisdictional relations, and executive and legislative branch collaborations. If it becomes necessary for the Chief Justice to appoint a Presiding Judge Pro Tempore for a single judge court pursuant to RCW 2.56.040(2) or other authority, then the State Court Administrator or the Chief Justice may consider consulting with the local executive or legislative authorities prior to the appointment. (c) Notification of Chief Justice. The Presiding Judge so elected shall send notice of the election of the Presiding Judge and Assistant Presiding Judge, and in cases of single judge courts, the predesignated Presiding Judge Pro Tempore, to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court within 30 days of election or any new or changed Presiding Judge or Presiding Judge Pro Tempore designations. (d) Caseload Adjustment. To the extent possible, the judicial caseload should be adjusted to provide the Presiding Judge with sufficient time and resources to devote to the management and administrative duties of the office. Commentary Whether caseload adjustments need to be made depends on the size and workload of the court. A recognition of the additional duties of the Presiding Judge by some workload adjustment should be made by larger courts. For example, the Presiding Judge could be assigned a smaller share of civil cases or a block of time every week could be set aside with no cases scheduled so the Presiding Judge could attend to administrative matters. (e) General Responsibilities. The Presiding Judge is responsible for leading the management and administration of the court's business, recommending policies and procedures that improve the court's effectiveness, and allocating resources in a way that maximizes the court's ability to resolve disputes fairly and expeditiously. (f) Duties and authority. The judicial and administrative duties set forth in this rule cannot be delegated to persons in either the legislative or executive branches nches of government. A Presiding Judge may delegate the performance of ministerial duties to court employees; however, it is still the Presiding Judge's responsibility to ensure they are performed in accordance with this rule. In addition to exercising general administrative supervision over the court, except those duties assigned to clerks of the superior court pursuant to law, the Presiding Judge shall: (1) Supervise the business of the judicial district and judicial officers in such manner as to ensure the expeditious and efficient processing of all cases and equitable distribution of the workload among judicial officers; (2) Assign judicial officers to hear cases pursuant to statute or rule. The court may establish general policies governing the assignment of judges; (3) Coordinate judicial officers' vacations, attendance at education programs, and similar matters; (4) Develop and coordinate statistical and management information; (5) Supervise the daily operation of the court including: (a) All personnel assigned to perform court functions; and (b) All personnel employed under the judicial branch of government, including but not limited to working conditions, hiring, discipline, line, and termination decisions excel wages, or benefits directly related to wages; and (c) The court administrator, or equivalent employee, who shall report directly to the Presiding Judge. Commentary The trial courts must maintain control of the working conditions for their employees. For some courts this includes control over some wage -related benefits such as vacation time. While the executive branch maintains control of wage issues, the courts must assert their control in all other areas of employee relations. With respect to the function of the court clerk, generally the courts of limited jurisdiction have direct responsibility for the administration of their clerk's office as well as the supervision of the court clerks who work in the courtroom. In the superior courts, the clerk's office may be under the direction of a separate elected official or someone appointed by the local judges or local legislative or executive authority. In those cases where the superior court is not responsible for the management of the clerk's office, the presiding judge should communicate to the county clerk any concerns regarding the performance of statutory court duties by county clerk personnel. A model job description, including qualification and experience criteria, for the court administrator position shall be established by the Board for Judicial Administration. A model job description that generally describes the knowledge, skills, and abilities of a court administrator would provide guidance to Presiding Judges in modifying current job duties/responsibilities or for courts initially hiring a court administrator or replacing a court administrator. (6) Supervise the court's accounts and auditing the procurement and disbursement of appropriations and preparation of the judicial district's annual budget request; (7) Appoint standing and special committees of judicial officers necessary for the proper performance of the duties of the judicial district; (8) Promulgate local rules as a majority of the judges may approve or as the Supreme Court shall direct; (9) Supervise the preparation and filing of reports required by statute and court rule; (10) Act as the official spokesperson for the court in all matters with the executive or legislative branches of state and local government and the community unless the Presiding Judge shall designate another judge to serve in this capacity; AWON WORKING AGREEMENT By and Between GRANT COUNTY / DISTRICT COURT And GRANT COUNTY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION DISTRICT COURT UNIT JANLJARY 1, 2024 WE DECEMBER 31, 2025 WORKING AGREEMENT By and Between GRANT COUNTY / DISTRICT COURT And GRANT COUNTY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION DISTRICT COURT UNIT JANLJARY 1, 2024 WE DECEMBER 31, 2025 This Agreement entered into by and between Grant County District Court Employees' Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Association" and the Board of Commissioners and the District Court Judges and Court Administrator, of Grant County, Washington, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer", has as its purpose the establishment of an equitable and peaceful procedure for the resolution of differences, and the establishment of rates of pay, hours of work, and other conditions of employment. Application of the terms of this Agreement to employees in the District Court shall be subject to the discretion of the Judge pursuant to General Rule 29. It is understood that judicial and administrative duties set forth in this rule cannot be delegated to persons in either the legislative or executive branches of government. The presiding judge of Grant County District Court or their judicial designee will maintain full responsibility for all worl�uig conditions, hiring, discipline and termination decisions regarding court employees (GR 29). This includes all layoff and recall decisions for all judicial branch positions. PRODUCTIVITY It is mutually agreed that. the Employer and the Association shall. work together individually and collectively to meet the production requirements of the Grant County District Court, to provide the public with efficient and courteous service, to encourage good attendance of employees, and to promote a climate of labor relations that will aid in achieving a high level of efficiency in District Court. ARTICLE I - RECOGNITION The Employer recognizes the Association as the exclusive bargaining agent for regular full- time and regular part-time clerical and community court employees of the Grant County District Court, excluding supervisors, confidential employees, probation officers, lead clerks, Court Administrator, Assistant Administrator, elected officials and appointed officials. ■ M E HUMAN RESOURCES 5 R x N T C t U N T y Grant County Human Resources Date: 04/30/2025 Time: 09:3oam Location: Grand Coulee Conference MOU between HR and District Court for HR services • Recruitment Services Keep as is. DC makes a request, HR posts. DC will take over managing the posting (dismissals etc.). HR will not prescreen or exclude applicants or materials. DC will maintain the interview questions. Once Neogov becomes official and operational, we can memorialize the process between HR & DC in writing with an amendment to this MOU if necessary. • Personnel Files DC to maintain all employee files, both current and former, through retention and destruction. • Labor Relations Keep as is. • Benefit Services Keep as is (HR). • FMLA — Family & Medical Leave Act Keep as is (HR). HR to send FMLA notice letters • PFML — Paid Family & Medical Leave Keep as is (HR). • Reasonable Accommodations Keep as is (DC). • Records Retention &Destruction See personnel files • Exit interviews HR shall not conduct exit uiterviews without notice and full consultation with DC. ***NO action shall be taken by HR concerning working conditions, recruitment, hiring, discipline, personnel files, records, and/or termination unless requested by DC or as listed above. SEE GR 29 5 b *** Judicial Independence Desktop Benchcard The extent to which judges enjoy judicial independence is directly related to the confidence the community and the other branches of local government have in their performance on and off the bench. Decreased trust and confidence, whether justified or not, will result in increased scrutiny and overreach by the other two branches of government. Of course, the performance of a judge includes decisions made on the bench, but most intrusions come from issues related to decisions about the proper operation of the court itself. Judicial independence can be unfairly affected by others in local government who either intentionally or unwittingly intrude on the court's authority. Some public officials want to assert their power over the court because they see themselves as the "leader" of local government, but building and maintaining trust and confidence in the court is still the answer. Judges cannot forget that the executive and legislative branches of local government also have powers and duties. It is incumbent on judges to respect those powers and duties as they navigate the intricacies of separation of powers and the attendant checks and balances that are built into our form of government. Judges are ambassadors of the legal system and must conduct themselves in that manner. Building trust and confidence starts in the campaign or interview phase and continues until retirement. Judicial independence is not based on power ("I'm the judge and you're not"), it is based on responsibility ("I'm the judge and I am here to serve my court and community"). Building healthy and appropriate relationships with other local government officials and respecting their roles in local government are the keys to carrying out your responsibilities in a way that will have little interference from the other two branches. Issue D istrict C o u its What are the main ethical Paragraph I of the Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct provides expectations for judicial that, "An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to impendence? our system of justice. " Rule 1.1 of the CJC provides, '®A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, * integrity, * and impartiality * of the 'udicia ... * What gives the court "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, authority as the third superior courts, Lusdces of the peace, and such inferior courts as the branch of government? legislature may provide. " Article -IV,,Section 1 Who sets the budget? Executive suggests and County Council (or County Commissioners) a pproves. RCW 3.58.050 Court sugaests its bud et . R 29(f)(61 Who manages the Court. Cry 29(f�(�) court's budget? Who does the court 'residing judge GR 29 administrator answer to? Who hires and manages staff GR29? GR 29�Q Is the judge involved in Yes, but only regarding working conditions. See RCW 41.56.020 collective bargaining? Zy1stro v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 7430 539 P.2d 823 (1975). When the judges were not included in collective bargaining... 11...we accordingly find that those portions of the collective bargaining agreement here involved which are wage related are permissible, and those portions relating to other than wages and direct gage -related benefits are ultra vires and void."* Id. At p - 750. See also, RCW 41.56-020 ' Who controls the Court, if it involves working conditions. grievance process? County, if it involves wages and benefits. Who gives the court legal Prosecutor, but see RPC 1.13. They are notes personal advice? attgpley. L"- ( Try IL9 — Judicial Independence gr 'bib is Responsi nes, * Decisiomd Independence 0 Employment Law * Insn'tudonalIndependence * Budget Constraints * NNork-place Conditions * Etlics Rules * Court Policies * Supervisionf Staff andjudges Court Programs 0 Branch Leadership Decisional Independence Y)/ I ne au,ili ty, to render dcklion free from 'influence based solelv on the individual facts applied toy the law, C nn b based on polifics, special 'interests, public opinion, public clamor. Without an.N.- restn. cfions, 'improper influences, pressures, threats or interferences direct or indirect, for any reason, * Make effort With their staff * Pe we nd Present a State of the Court for the Council CROSSLER v. HILLE (1998) Supreme Court of Washington,En Banc. Certification from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Judy CROSSLER, a single woman, Plaintiff, v. Adalia HILLE and John Doe Hille, husband and wife; Shawn R. Logan, W.L. Schlagel, and Bill Wills; Adams County, a municipal corporation, Defendants. No. 66415-3. Decided: September 03, 1998 Perkins, Coie, Thomas F. Kingen, Spokane, for defendants. Paul Burns, Spokane, for plaintiff. The United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington, certified the following question under RCW 2.60: Is a district court judge bound by a county personnel handbook, approved by the county and previous district court judges, in her decision to terminate a district court clerk, when the judge has never �personally adopted the terms of the handbook? Order Granting Mot. to Certify to Washington State Supreme Court at 3 (Order). Short Answer: No. The certified question is very narrow in scope and limited by the record before us. We do not seekto make abroad statement concerni ngthe law of employment relations between district court deputy clerks and judges because we understand the tasks performed by district court deputy clerks vary significantly throughout the state. We also realize employment relationships between district court deputy clerks and judges may differ from the relationship at issue in this question because the nature of the employment relationship often depends upon the size of the county, the size of the court, and the manner in which the judge and districtcourtdeputy clerk arrive at their respective positions. We refrain from addressingthe wide range of possible employment relationships. FACTS From 1979 through 1992, plaintiff, Judy Crossler, worked as an Adams County employee. For two years, she worked in the Sheriff's office and, until 1992, for the Department of Public Works. Defendant, Adalia Hille, was appointed Adams County District Court Judge in 1992 and was elected to a four-year term in 1993. In 1992, Judge Hille hired Crossler as a district court deputy clerk. In 1988, the Adams County personnel policy (Handbook) was adopted by the County Commissioners, the Prosecuting Attorney, the Auditor, the Treasurer, the Assessor, the County Clerk, the Superior Court, and the District Courts.' The Handbook was signed by the County Commissioners, former Superior Court Judge Gordon Swyter, former District Court Judge Denis Morgan, and Othello District Court Judge Charlotte DuBois.2- The Handbook includes termination and discipline standards and procedures, and specifically provides for a pretermination hearing between the employer and employee. In 1988, while workingfor the Department of Public Works, Crossler received a copy of the Handbook. Crossler read and understood the contents of the Handbook. Crossler knew the Handbook had been signed by Judge Hille's predecessors and she believed the Handbook applied to all Adams County employees, including those in the Adams County District Courts. In 1997, Judge Hille terminated Crossler from her position as district court deputy clerk. Crossler requested a grievance hearing before the County Commissioners in accordance with the Handbook.. The County Commissioners informed Crossler they had no authority to review Judge Hille's employment decisions. Ina letter dated March 24, 1997, the County Commissioners told Crossler that employees of the Ritzville District Court are employees underthe direct supervision and management of elected official Judge Hille and "their jurisdiction over the department is limited towage and wage related matters and working conditions only." Crossler argues the Handbook governs the outcome of this case. Crossler allegesthe Handbook created a contract of employment barring her termination for other than just cause and that any just cause termination must, by contract, be preceded by a termination hearing. Crossler contends the Handbook created a property right in her employment and that her termination, without a hearing, constituted a breach of contract and violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Crossler filed her action in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington, under 42 U.S.0 § 1983. In the order granting the motion to certify the question to the Washington State Supreme Court, the Honorable Robert H. Whaley stated: [T]he Court has concluded that an issue of fact exists as to whether Judge Hille complied with the mandatory terms of the personnel policy. However, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted if Judge Hille is not bound to comply with the terms of the policy. Order at 2-3. ANALYSIS Although Crossler was hired by Judge H i lle and was never an employee of Judge H i lle's predecessors, Crossler asks us to find the County Commissioners, former District Court Judge Morgan, and Othello District Court Judge DuBois have the authority to bind a sitting judge in the administration of his or her court. Such a findingwould require us to deviate from prior case law and statutory authority. Ability of Elected Officials to Create Binding Employment Contracts A. Authority of District Court Judges District court judges have the authority to prescribe the duties of district court deputy clerks. King County v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 72 Wash.2d 604, 611,434 P.2d 554 (1967); RCW 3.54.020.a Although a judge may individually perform all the necessary duties required to manage a court, a judge is entitled to hire additional employees to assist in a court's administration, but this decision is "at his [or her] own choice and judgment." King County, 72 Wash.2d at 609,434 P.2d 554. The ability of a judge to make independent employment decisions has been discussed and decided. In King County, 72 Wash.2d at 611,434 P.2d 554, we explained: The history of the Justice Court Act legislation disclosed that originally the district justice court was to appoint his clerk and deputy clerks as required. This was amended so that the county commissioners were to make these appointments. Senate Journal, 37th Legislature (1961) at 790. This section was later vetoed by the Governor on the basis that the judiciary was a separate and independent branch of government and such appointments by the county commissioners might well interferewith the independent discharge of duties of the justice of the peace (district justice court judge). Senate Journal, 37th Legislature (1961) at 1211. These appointments, therefore, became the prerogative of the district justice court judge. As appointees of the judge, clerks perform tasks as assigned and serve at the pleasure of the elected judge. In King County, we later stated: But no place in said act does it appear (nor can it necessarily be inferred or implied) that the employment of such employees in any wise relieved the district justice court judge of his own responsibility for the proper conduct of the functions of his office. He might, but need not, employ such clerks as he deemed necessary under the exigencies of his office. He was given the privilege of prescribing the duties of such subordinates. This he did. They were his employees and responsibility and he might hire and fire them atwill. They were thereto assist him in the administration of his office. They were not to supersede or displace any of his functions. He was still their overseer in order to observe whether the duties of his office were properly managed and conducted. King County, 72 Wash.2d at 612, 434 P.2d 554 (emphasis added). The law has not changed. The independence of judges with regard to employment decisions continues to be recognized by this court. Although the case involves a different type of court employee, in Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash.2d 743, 74% 539 P.2d 823 (1975), the court found that juvenile court probation counselors held: a dual status: They are employees of the county for purposes of negotiating matters relating to wages. However, for purposes of hiring, firing, working conditions, and other matters necessarily within the statutory responsibility of the juvenile court judges, plaintiffs are employees of the court and thus of the State's judicial branch. (Emphasis added). The facts of this case fit squarely withi n the holdings of King County and Zylstra. We conclude Judge Hille had the authority to make employment decisions concerning the administration of the court. Despite precedent establishing the independent nature of the court, Crossler argues she is a county employee and either the County Commissioners or the former and current District Court Judges have the authority to set employment policies for current and future court employees. She further argues the voluntary acceptance of the Handbook by the former and current District Court Judges established an expectation and a property interest inthe district court deputy clerk position that can be revoked only by a positive action. This argument assumes the County Commissioners or the former and current District Court Judges had the ability to make such a binding employment contract. B. Authority of County Commissioners Absent specific authoritytothe contrary, a board of county commissioners has no authority to interfere with an elected official's hiring decision. Osborn v. Grant County, 130 Wash.2d 615, 6232 926 P.2d 911 (1996). In Osborn, the board of commissioners argued it should have some say in the irresponsible hiring decisions of elected officials and pointed to RCW 36.16.070 4-to support its argument. The board argued RCW 36.16.070 expressly required the elected official to seek the consent of the Grant County Commissioners before making hiring decisions. We did not agree and held once the board creates and funds the positions, the county officer is the party who names the individuals to fill those positions. Osborn, 130 Wash.2d at 622, 926 P.2d 911; see also Thomas v. Whatcom County, 82 Wash. 113, 124, 143 P. 881 (1914) (once the board has authorized the hiring of deputies in a county office, "the officer in whose office the deputies are to serve, being responsible on his bond for their conduct, has the absolute right to determine the personnel of such deputies. "); Jackson v. Thurston County, 127 Wash. 41, 43-44, 219 P. 840 (1923) (the sheriff, being responsible on his official bond for the acts of his deputies, had the right of appointment). The commissioners have the ability to authorize and fund a position, but this authority does not extend to specific personnel decisions. As we stated, "[i]f an official makes a poor hiring decision, the official is accountable not to the board of commissioners, but to the public." Osborn, 130 Wash.2d at 624, 926 P.2d 911. In the present case, the County Commissioners have no authority to impose employment policies on a district court iudgte. Like the commissioners in Osborn, Thomas, and Jackson, here the County Commissioners have the ability and the obligation to provide funding for the district court deputy clerks, but the County Commissioners do not have the authority to determine the employment policies of the elected official. We find the Adams County Commissioners are not Crossler's "employer" because they have no connection with Crossler's employment other than to budget money enabling the judge to fill the position of deputy clerk. See Keenan v. Allan, 889 F.Supp. 1320 (E.D.Wash.1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir.1996). County Commissioners cannot alter the employment status of a judge's employee from "at will" to "for cause" simply by issuing an employment policy handbook. We have recognized the limited authority of county commissioners in the past and there is no reason to change our position in this case. C. Authority of Prior Judge Crossler argues Judge Hille is bound by her predecessor's voluntary agreement to the terms of the Handbook because Judge Hille never revoked or rescinded the agreement as the "officer" of the district court. Crossler insists Judge Hille's failure to explicitly revoke the "agreement" effectively deprives Crossler of a constitutionally protected property interest without due process of law. Crossler does not explain, or cite authority that would explain, how former Judge Morgan could create a binding future contract between his successor, Judge Hille, and Judge Hille's employee. In 10A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.101, at 44 (3d ed.1990) (the "McQuillin test"),the following is written about the ability of elected officials to form employment contracts beyond their elected term: [T]he general rule seems to be that a contract of employment extending beyond the term of the office of the members of a public board . is, if made in good faith, ordinarily a valid contract. However, where the nature of an office or employment is such that it requires a municipal board or officer to exercise supervisory control over the appointee or employee, together with the power of removal, such employment or contract of employment constitutes exercise of a governmental function, and such contracts must not be extended beyond the life of the board. (Emphasis added). Using the McQuillin test, we find Crossler's employment was "governmental" because the position required supervisory control by Judge Hille (RCW 2.28.010 5), Judge Hille retained the power of removal (see King County, 72Wash.2d at612, 434 P.2d 554), and Judge Hille'stenure was for a finite period of time see RCW 3.34.070 (a district court judge serves a term of four years if elected or appointed) and RCW 3.34.100 (an appointed district court judge holds office until the next general election). The McQuillin test has been used by other courts to resolve similar questions. Specifically, the Oregon Court of Appeals was confronted with a similar question when the outgoing county commissioners attempted to bind the incoming county commissioners to a Director of Personnel, through an employment contract permitting termination for death, disability or cause only. Board of Klamath County Cornm'rs v. Select County Employees, 148 Or.App. 48, 939 P.2d 80 (1997). The Court of Appeals turned to the Oregon Supreme Court, which had previously stated, "[w]ithout question, `an outgoing elected governing body of finite tenure which enter[s] into a contract involving a "governmental" function [can]not bind a subsequently elected body.'" Board of Klamath County Comm'rs,148 Or.App. at 53, 939 P.2d 80 (some alterations in original) (quoting Graves v. Arnado, 307 Or. 358, 364) 768 P.2d 910 (1989)); see also Miles v. City of Baker, 152 Or. 87, 92-93, 51 P.2d 1047 (1935) ("if the work provided for in plaintiff's alleged contract is a governmental function, then the great weight of authority is to the effect that the outgoi ng counci l could not bi nd its successors i n such a contract."); Johnson v. City of Pendleton, 131 Or. 46, 55, 280 P. 873 (1929) (city possesses no power to enter contract bi ndi ng city for all ti me to make annual levy for specific purpose, because "[u]pon matters which are purely governmental in their nature . no legislative act will bind a subsequent legislature:'); Jacobbergerv. School Dist. No. 1, 122 Or. 124, 131, 256 P. 652 (1927) (officers of municipal corporation, in exercise of corporation's governmental powers, may not bind municipality beyond terms of their office). Like the McQuillin test, Oregon requires an inquiry into whether an employment contract calls for the performance of governmental functions and whether the service of the board, governing body, or elected official is of finite tenure. Board of Klamath County Comm'rs, 148 Or.App. at 53,939 P.2d 80. In Board of Klamath County Comm'rs, the court held the outgoing county commissioners could not bind their successors because the commissioners allowed the director of personnel to exercise the county commissioners' governmental functions of making policy judgments, ranking and evaluating policy objectives and makingchoicesamong competinggoals, and becausethe board of county commissioners is an elected governing body of finite tenure due to the fact a majority of the board must stand for election atthe sametime. Board of Klamath County Comm'rs, 148 Or.App. at 54, 939 P.2d 80. The contract that prevented the incoming county commissioners from terminatingthe director of personnelwas found to be unenforceable. Crossler argues her employment was not "governmental," but was simply clerical. Crossler argues because her employment is not "governmental," former District Court Judge Morgan's acceptance of the Handbook created a contract that extended beyond his elected term and to individuals not a party to the contract. This argument is without merit. Even if Crossler's duties were clerical, she is deemed a "governmental" employee because (1) Crossler was performing tasks for which Judge Hille was responsible; (2) Judge Hille was required to supervise Crossler's employment; (3) Judge Hille was able to terminate Crossler; and (4) Judge Hille's term was for four years. The clerical nature of Crossler's employment is irrelevant to the resolution of this certified question. We hold that Crossler is an at will employee of Judge Hille and that neither the Adams County Commissioners, former District Court Judge Morgan, nor Othello District Court Judge DuBois have the authority to bind Judge H i lle to the policies contained in the Handbook. Despite being paid by the county, in this case Crossler is a judicial employee, not a county employee, and therefore is net ®protected" by the terms of the county employment Handbook. The certified question is answered no. Under the facts of this case, Judge Hille is not bound by the county personnel Handbook, approved by the County Commissioners and former and current District Court Judges. Judge Hille never personally adopted the terms of the Handbook and neither the County Commissioners nor former Judge Morgan or Judge DuBois have the authority to create binding employment policies for Judge HILLe. I agree with the majority the answer to the certified question is" no." I write separately to emphasize the reasons for our answer to the certified question relate to the particular circumstances of Ms. Crossler's employment by the Adams County District Court. Judge H i LLe was the only judge serving in the Ritzvi Lle District Court; that court employed only four people including Ms. Crossler. Ms. Crossler's work included a number of specific duties for Judge HILLe, including the handling of bench warrants; making necessary changes and adjustments to cases; maintaining the court's procedure book; inputting all criminal, infraction and civil files; receiving civil money; setting contested and mitigated hearings; and performing bailiff duties. In sum, Ms. Crossler was employed in a small court to perform court duties personal to Judge Hille as the only district court judge on that bench. Under the circumstances, it is inescapable that Ms. Crossler was the personal court staff of Judge Hille and an at -will employee of Judge Hille under the district court act. emphasize these facts because the majority's opinion could be interpreted more broadly than is necessary. Plainly, in larger district courts, employees denominated "deputy clerks" would, for example, be performing nothing more than clericalworkand would be objectively viewed as "court generalists" not performing proprietary work as a member of the personal staff of a judge. For such employees, personnel policies could be adopted by the county or by the district court judges collectively of the particuLarjurisdiction to govern the employment relationship between that employee and the court. That is not the case in the present action. For staff personal to a judge, that judge must have the di screti on to hire and fire staff as that elected judge deems appropriate. Confidentiality in the relationship between the judge and his or her personal staff is essential to the core judicial function. By contrast, staff that is not in such a confidential relationship with a judge should not be subject to a "spoils system" that requires each elected judge, upon his or her election, to reaffirm those portions of the jurisdiction's personnel policy that he or she deems applicable to the court's employees. Ina multi -judge jurisdiction, such a process would be unworkable. Certain general employment -related requirements proposed by the legislative and executive branches of both local and state government must surely apply to judicial employees. Individual judicial fiat, for example, cannot invalidate laws relatingtoworkplace safety, industrial insurance, and discrimination that are applicable to public employees working in the judicial branch of state or local government. The majority's opinion does not go so far, nor should it. I agreewiththe majority Ms. Crosslerwasan at-willemployee of Judge Hille in Light of the small size of the Ritzville branch of the Adams County District Court and the nature of the duties she performed for Judge HiLLe. I do not believe our opinion should be read beyond the narrow facts present here. FOOTNOTES 1. There are two district courts in Adams County: Othello District Court and Ritzville District Court. . Crossler emphasizes that although the current Superior Court Judge, Auditor, and Treasurer did not sign the 1988 Handbook, they have expressly acknowledged they and thei r offices are bound by the policy. First, the application of the Handbook to employees of these officials is not at issue. Second, these officials expressly acknowledged the application of the Handbook; Judge Hille did not. . RCW 3.54.020 providesthatthe judge directs the scope of the employment:"The district courts shall prescribe the duties of the clerk and deputy clerks. Such duties shall include all of the requirements of RCW 3.62.020 and 3.62.040 as now or hereafter amended and the receipt of bail and additionally the power to:"(1) Accept and enter pleas;"(2) Receive bail asset by the court;"(3) Set cases for trial;"(4) Administer oaths," (Emphasis added). 4. RCW 36.16.070 states: "In all cases where the duties of any county office are greater than can be performed bythe person elected to fill it, the officer may employ deputies and other necessary employees with the consent of the board of county commissioners. The board shall fixtheir compensation and shall require what deputies shall give bond and the amount of bond required from each. The sureties on deputies' bonds must be approved by the board and the premium therefor i-s a county expense."A deputy may perform any act which his principal is authorized to perform. The officer appointing a deputy or other employee shall be responsible for the acts of his appointees upon his official bond and may revoke each appointment at pleasure." FN5. RCW 2.28.010(5) provides: "Every court of justice has power. (5)[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto." (Emphasis added).. FN5. RCW 2.28.010(5) provides: "Every court of justice has power. (5)[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto." (Emphasis added). JOHNSON, Justice. DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, SMITH, GUY, ALEXAN DER and SANDERS, JJ., concur. htt s:I/caseLaw.findLaw.com/courtlwa-s„, reme-court/1289136.htmL Judge Lev vs. City of Bellingham In 2021, Bellingham Municipal Court Presiding Judge Debra Lev filed a lawsuit against the City of Bellingham and Mayor Seth Fleetwood, alleging that the city's investigations into court working conditions violated the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches. The lawsuit, filed in Whatcom County Superior Court, claimed that the city's actions constituted illegal interference with the municipal court system, its administration, and practices. The core of the dispute revolved around the city's investigations into workplace issues within the Municipal Court, which Judge Lev argued were the purview of the court's administrative supervision, not the city's executive branch. The lawsuit was ultimately settled through mediation, with an agreement reached on or about September 23, 2021. The settlement affirmed that while court employees are city employees, the Washington State Supreme Court"s General Rule 29, which grants the Presiding Judge administrative supervision over judicial branch employees, applied to the Bellingham Municipal court. This included ■ r r r . i s t r ■ y t • r The matters like wo l � o conditions,, hirli�nc,d�sc�pl�ne and termination decisions. ,�igarg5?Y5n'"^ro"tmnW 'i?rmF"% .. -i .. r ... m � also e v aslzed tne co -equal a sot an ti r of city govern rneint, pnd the ned to m epe,�each 'c other's nd e mn�`..ai c nnd legal ega res p o'. n si b l ia e s .